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FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN ELECTIONS 
UNDER THE NON-INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE: 
WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT “COERCION” 
STEVEN WHEATLEY* 
This article looks at the problem of foreign state cyber and influence 
operations targeting democratic elections through the lens of the non-
intervention principle. The work focuses on the meaning of “coercion” 
following the 1986 Nicaragua case, wherein the International Court of 
Justice concluded that “[i]ntervention is wrongful when it uses methods of 
coercion.” The analysis shows that coercion describes a situation where (1) 
the foreign power wants the target state to do something and wants to be 
certain this will happen; (2) the outside power then takes some action, either 
by issuing a coercive threat, using coercive force, or engaging in the 
coercive manipulation of the target’s decision-making process; and (3) the 
target then does that something. The application of this understanding to the 
problem of cyber and influence operations targeting elections leads to the 
following conclusions: the hacking of the information and communications 
technologies used in elections is always coercive, and therefore wrongful, 
because the foreign power is trying to get the target state to do something it 
would not otherwise do; fake news operations are coercive, and therefore 
prohibited, where they are designed to get the electorate to vote differently; 
disinformation campaigns intended to cause policy paralysis or manipulate 
the views of the population also constitute coercion, and, therefore, violate 
the non-intervention rule. By explaining the meaning of “coercion,” this 
article demonstrates that the long-established principle of non-intervention 
can regulate the new problem of cyber and influence operations targeting 
elections. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the legality of foreign state cyber and influence 
operations targeting democratic elections. Whilst there are several ways the 
issue can be framed,1 this work looks at the subject from the perspective of 
the non-intervention principle, which prohibits states from intervening in the 
internal affairs of other states. There are four reasons for this lens. First, the 
non-intervention principle (also referred to as the principle of non-
intervention, and non-intervention rule) is well established in international 
law. Second, the international law that applies to the cyber domain are the 
same ones that apply in the physical world. Third, democratic states have 
framed the issue in these terms. Finally, non-intervention is the dominant 
way that international lawyers think about the problem of foreign 
interference in elections.2 
The dangers of foreign state cyber and influence operations targeting 
elections first emerged following complaints that Russia meddled in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election.3 Later, in 2018, a meeting of Foreign and 
 
 1.  See Barrie Sander, Democracy Under the Influence: Paradigms of State Responsibility for 
Cyber Influence Operations on Elections, 18 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2019). 
 2.  See Jens David Ohlin, Election Interference: The Real Harm and The Only Solution 6 (Cornell 
Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper No. 18-50, 2018) (stating that “the basic rubric for evaluating 
legal election interference involves a resort to the basic standards for non-intervention.”). 
 3.  The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence concluded that Russian cyber and 
influence operations during the 2016 Presidential election were motivated by a desire to support the 
candidacy of Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton and to undermine the faith of the American public in 
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Security Ministers of the G7 states—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
United Kingdom, and United States—highlighted the dangers of outside 
powers “tampering with election results” and “manipulating public 
discourse.”4 A 2019 speech by the U.K. Foreign Secretary outlines these 
concerns, where he explained that a foreign power, “armed with nothing 
more ambitious than a laptop computer,” could manipulate the outcome of 
an election, either by injecting propaganda into the campaign, or even 
changing the result where an electronic voting system is used.5 
Because the non-intervention principle only prohibits “coercive” 
interferences in the internal affairs of other states,6 this is said to create 
difficulties for its application to state cyber and influence operations, as 
coercion is often thought to require a conscious unwilling act on the part of 
the victim.7 Nazi officials subjecting “third-degree methods of pressure” to 
the President and Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia in 1939, 
Czechoslovakia was clearly coerced— consciously, albeit unwillingly, into 
agreeing to the establishment of a German protectorate over Bohemia and 
Moravia.8 However, this understanding of coercion does not translate easily 
to the cyber domain, where the principal threats are the clandestine hacking 
of the information and communications technologies (ICTs) used in 
elections. In the cyber domain, the target state is often not conscious of the 
hack nor of the cyber influence operations targeting citizens through social 
media to affect their voting patterns. 
 
the democratic process. OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND 
INTENTIONS IN RECENT U.S. ELECTIONS, (Jan. 6, 2017). After the vote, the U.S. announced that it was 
introducing a range of sanctions against Russian nationals and entities, with President Obama stating that 
these were “a necessary and appropriate response to efforts to harm U.S. interests in violation of 
established international norms of behavior.” THE WHITE HOUSE, OFF. OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, STATEMENT 
BY THE PRESIDENT ON ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY AND 
HARASSMENT (Dec. 29, 2016) (emphasis added), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/ 
2016/12/29/statement-president-actions-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity. President Obama’s 
choice of words led some to decide that the United States did not view the alleged Russian activities as 
violations of international law, although others took the opposite view, concluding that the responses 
amounted to countermeasures in reaction to a prohibited intervention in domestic political affairs. 
 4.  Defending Democracy—Addressing Foreign Threats, GOV’T OF CAN. (Aug. 1, 2019), https:// 
www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relationsinternationales/g7/documents/ 
2018-04-22-defending_democracy-defendre_democratie.aspx?lang=eng. 
 5.  Jeremy Hunt, Foreign Sec’y, U.K., Address at the University of Glasgow: Deterrence in the 
Cyber Age (Mar. 7 2019). 
 6.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) (“Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion . . . .”). 
 7.  See Katharina Ziolkowski, Peacetime Cyber Espionage: New Tendencies in Public 
International Law, in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE: INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY 425, 433 (Katharina Ziolkowski ed., 2013). 
 8.  See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 246, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1. 
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Presently, there is no agreement amongst international lawyers as to 
whether, and when, the hacking of elections and targeted disinformation 
campaigns can be categorized as “coercive.” One consequence of this is that 
hostile powers can operate in a legal grey zone, avoiding condemnation, 
because of the lack of agreed upon norms.9 We see the problem in attempts 
to evaluate the legality of the so-called “DNC hack,” which occurred during 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election and was widely blamed on Russia.10 
Private emails belonging to the Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
were published on the Internet, confirming that the DNC favoured Hillary 
Clinton over Bernie Sanders in the presidential primaries, damaging the 
Clinton campaign against Donald Trump. A leading scholar on the law on 
election interference, Jens Ohlin, concluded that whilst the hack “was 
certainly corrosive” to the proper functioning of American democracy, “it is 
genuinely unclear whether it should count as coercive,” leaving “an overall 
impression of illegal conduct, but without a clear and unambiguous doctrinal 
route towards that conclusion.”11 
Uncertainty about the notion of cyber-coercion has led some writers to 
call for a reformulation of the non-intervention principle for the cyber 
domain.12 Others claim that we should largely abandon the non-intervention 
principle, and look instead to the principle of sovereignty.13 This is the 
approach of the influential Tallinn Manual 2.0, which maintains that we can 
deduce a rule prohibiting cyber operations that interfere with elections,14 
from the more general rule that a cyber operation must not violate the 
 
 9.  Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey 
Zones of International Law, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 30, 66 (2018). 
 10.  See Ido Kilovaty, Doxfare: Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the Norm on Non-
Intervention in the Era of Weaponized Information, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 146, 150 (2018). 
 11.  Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International 
Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1593–94 (2017). 
 12.  On the various proposals, see Rebecca Crootof, International Cybertorts: Expanding State 
Accountability in Cyberspace, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 565, 630 (2018) (quoting Duncan Hollis); Duncan 
B. Hollis, Russia and the DNC Hack: What Future for a Duty of Non-Intervention?, OPINO JURIS (July 
25, 2016), http://opinlojuris.org/2016/07/25/russia-and-the-dn-hack-a-violation-of-the-duty-of-non-
intervention [http://perma.cc/D6G8-NFCZ]; Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of 
Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 8 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180687; Sander, supra 
note 1, 22–23 (quoting Myers S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, International Coercion and World 
Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L. J. 771, 782 (1958)). 
 13.  For a good introduction to the debate, see Harriet Moynihan, The Application of International 
Law to State Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-intervention, (Chatham House Res. Paper, 2019), 
https://reader.chathamhouse.org/application-international-law-state-cyberattacks-sovereignty-and-non-
intervention?preview=1#. 
 14.  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS at 
20, 22 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
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sovereignty of another state.15 The Tallinn Manual explains that the principle 
of sovereignty differs from the non-intervention principle because 
“intervention requires an element of coercion.”16 
The drawbacks with arguments that we should avoid or evade the 
“problem of coercion” are threefold. First, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) did not err when it concluded that the element of coercion “defines, 
and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention.”17 Coercion, 
or its functional equivalent, such as dictatorial interference, has been an 
element in the non-intervention principle since the end of the nineteenth 
century.18 Secondly, the role of sovereignty in the regulation of state cyber 
operations is the subject of significant disagreement between international 
lawyers,19 and, moreover, the rule has nothing to say about influence 
operations.20 Finally, the principle of non-intervention provides the 
established basis on which states and international lawyers, from all parts of 
the world, frame foreign state interference in domestic political affairs. 
To make sense of the cyber non-intervention principle, states and 
international lawyers need to be clear about the meaning of “coercion,” given 
the ICJ’s conclusion in the Nicaragua case that, “Intervention is [only] 
wrongful when it uses methods of coercion.”21 This article fills a significant 
gap in the existing literature by explaining this meaning of coercion, and by 
applying the understanding of coercion to the problem of cyber and influence 
operations targeting elections. 
 
 15.  Id. at 17. 
 16.  Id. at 24. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 also recognizes the application of the non-intervention 
principle to the cyber domain in Rule 66: “A State may not intervene, including by cyber means, in the 
internal or external affairs of another State.” The Tallinn Manual 2.0 confirms that the principle of non-
intervention only applies to operations “that have coercive effect” (Rule 66, Explanatory para. 3). The 
example given (without further explanation) is that of “using cyber operations to remotely alter electronic 
ballots and thereby manipulate an election” (Explanatory para. 2). 
 17.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 14, ¶ 205. 
 18.  The association between intervention and coercion was first made by John Stuart Mill in 1859. 
See 21 JOHN S. MILL, A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN 
STUART MILL 111, 123–24 (John M. Robson ed., Univ. Toronto Press, 1984). In 1925, the Draft Code of 
American International Law, drawn up by the Pan-American Union, concluded that “[t]he sole lawful 
intervention is friendly and conciliatory action without any character of coercion.” J. L. Brierly, The Draft 
Code of American International Law, 7 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 14, 22 (1926). 
 19.  On the debate, see Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AM. J. 
INT’L L. UNBOUND 207 (2017); Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 
95 TEX. L. REV. 1639 (2017). 
 20.  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 14, at 26 (“With regard to propaganda, the International 
Group of Experts agreed that its transmission into other States is generally not a violation of 
sovereignty.”). 
 21.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 14, ¶ 205 (alteration in original). 
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The article proceeds as follows: Section 1 explains the concerns around 
foreign state cyber and influence operations targeting elections; Section 2 
examines the non-intervention principle, outlining its evolution from the 
time of Emer de Vattel to the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment, and confirming the 
application of the rule to the cyber domain; Section 3 turns to the meaning 
of coercion, showing that it describes a situation in which one voluntary 
agent wrongfully exercises power over another through the deployment of 
coercive threats, the use of coercive force, or the coercive manipulation of 
the target’s decision-making process; Section 4 applies this understanding of 
coercion to the problem of cyber and influence operations targeting 
elections. The article demonstrates that any cyber operations hacking the 
computer infrastructure used in elections are, by definition, coercive, and 
therefore prohibited under the non-intervention principle. On the other hand, 
influence operations are more complicated. Although the provision of factual 
information through social media is not unlawful, some fake news and 
disinformation campaigns can be categorized as coercive where the objective 
is to usurp the target state’s right to make decisions. 
II. CYBER AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS TARGETING 
ELECTIONS 
States interfering in the electoral processes of other states is not new: 
between 1946 and 2000, the United States and the Soviet Union—and later 
Russia—interfered in approximately one in nine competitive elections in 
other states.22 However, new information and communications technologies 
(ICTs) have created unprecedented opportunities for hostile countries to 
disrupt elections. Foreign powers can, for instance, disable vital computer 
systems, such as when hackers deleted key files and rendered the vote-
tallying system inoperable during the 2014 Ukraine presidential election.23 
Additionally, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, in which data 
requests flood a website’s server and overwhelms its ability to respond, can 
 
 22.  Dov H. Levin, Partisan Electoral Interventions by the Great Powers: Introducing the PEIG 
Dataset, 36 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 88, 94 (2019). See also, Dov H. Levin, When the Great 
Power Gets a Vote: The Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions on Election Results, 60 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 189, 189 (2016). 
 23.  Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly Avoided ‘Wanton Destruction’ from Hackers, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/World/Passcode/ 
2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers. See also LAURA 
GALANTE & SHAUN EE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, DEFINING RUSSIAN ELECTION INTERFERENCE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF SELECT 2014 TO 2018 CYBER ENABLED INCIDENTS 7–8 (2018). 
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inhibit elections, as occurred on Bulgaria’s Electoral Commission’s website 
during the 2015 local elections.24 
Reliance on ICTs also allows foreign powers to gain unauthorized 
access to a computer or computer network to affect the outcome of the vote. 
This can be done in four ways.25 First, voters can be removed from the 
electoral roll.26 Second, a state can interfere with the workings of electronic 
voting machines (where e-voting is used), changing the preferences of voters 
or making votes disappear. Third, the outcome of the vote can be changed 
by hacking the vote tabulation software. In 2014, Ukraine’s presidential 
election was targeted by hackers, who accessed the Electoral Commission’s 
computer, changing the result to show that the winner was a far-right, ultra-
nationalist, candidate, with thiry-seven percent of the vote, as opposed to the 
actual one percent.27 Finally, the legitimacy of an election can be undermined 
by creating confusion around the outcome. For example, false results were 
announced on Ghana Electoral Commission’s Twitter account while the 
ballots were still being counted.28 
 
 24.  Huge Hack Attack on Bulgaria Election Authorities ‘Not to Affect Vote Count’, NOVINITE.COM: 
SOFIA NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 27, 2015, 1:14 PM), https://bit.ly/35vZQbE. A U.K. Parliamentary 
Committee expressed concern that the crashing of a voter registration website before the Brexit vote could 
have been caused by a DDoS launched by foreign powers. See PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EU REFERENDUM, REPORT, 
2016-17, HC 496,  ¶ 102–03 (UK). There is also the risk that the website of a political party could be hit 
by a DDoS. In 2018, a United States official blamed Russia for an attack on the website of an opposition 
party in Mexico during a televised presidential debate, after the website had published documents critical 
of another candidate. See David Alire Garcia & Noe Torres, Russia Meddling in Mexican Election: White 
House Aide McMaster, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2018, 4:31 PM), https://www.investing.com/news/world-
news/russia-meddling-in-mexican-election-white-house-aide-mcmaster-1073182; see also Daina Beth 
Solomon, Cyber Attack on Mexico Campaign Site Triggers Election Nerves, REUTERS (June 13, 2018, 
4:42 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-election-cyber/cyber-attack-on-mexico-campaign-
site-triggers-election-nerves-idUSKBN1J93BU. 
 25.  See Scott Shackelford et al., Making Democracy Harder to Hack, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 
629, 636–38 (2017) (describing how foreign powers can influence an election through computer 
networks). 
 26.  See generally Philip Bump, When We Talk About Russian Meddling, What Do We Actually 
Mean?, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2018, 10:37 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/ 
wp/2018/02/13/when-we-talk-about-russian-meddling-what-do-we-actually-mean/ (explaining what 
Russian interference consisted of in the 2016 election); see also Isabella Hansen & Darren J. Lim, Doxing 
Democracy: Influencing Elections via Cyber Voter Interference, 25 CONTEMP. POL. 150 (2018) 
(examining the influence of state-sponsored cyber voting operations). 
 27.  NICHOLAS CHEESEMAN & BRIAN P. KLAAS, HOW TO RIG AN ELECTION 131 (Yale Univ. Press 
2018). The Election Commission noticed the hack and managed to avoid naming the wrong winner. Id. 
 28.  Joseph R.A. Ayee, Ghana’s Elections of 7 December 2016: A Post-Mortem, 24 S. AFR. J. INT’L 
AFF. 311, 314 (2017); see also Michael Amoah, Sleight is Right: Cyber Control as a New Battleground 
for African Elections, 119 AFR. AFF. 68 (2019) (discussing how the growth of hacking has turned 
electronic data management into a key battleground in African elections). 
WHEATLEY_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2021  11:12 AM 
168 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:161 
New technologies also allow foreign powers to engage in influence 
operations that aim to align the political views of the target population with 
the interests of the foreign power.29 Before the Internet, it was difficult for 
states to directly influence citizens in other states. So, between 1951 and 
1956, NATO countries were reduced to sending balloons carrying 
propaganda leaflets into Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.30 These 
days, political debates often occur in cyberspace,31 as opposed to the past, 
when democratic discussion took place in the town square, in television or 
radio studio, or the pages of a newspaper.32 The Internet reduces the 
importance of distance and national boundaries, making it much easier for 
foreign states to inject propaganda into election campaigns.33 The best-
known example is Russia’s operation to shape the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election (although Russia denies responsibility).34 The fact that foreign states 
can insert cyber propaganda into an election campaign is significant because 
the evidence shows that if you can control the information available to 
voters, you can determine the electoral outcome.35 
III. THE NON-INTERVENTION PRINCIPLE 
The principle of non-intervention was first explained by Emer de Vattel 
in the Law of Nations, where he writes that “no state has the smallest right to 
 
 29.  See Duncan B. Hollis, The Influence of War; the War for Influence, 32 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L. J. 31, 35 (2018) (explaining how influence operations involve the deployment of informational 
resources through e-mail and social media postings and the virtual collection of data). 
 30.  LINDA ROBINSON ET AL., MODERN POLITICAL WARFARE: CURRENT PRACTICES AND POSSIBLE 
RESPONSES 19–20 (2018). States still engage in the practice today. Justin McCurry, Kim Yo-jong Warns 
South Korea to Tackle ‘Evil’ Propaganda Balloons, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2020, 11:29 PM), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/04/kim-yo-jong-warns-south-korea-to-tackle-evil-propaganda-
balloons. 
 31.  The notion of “cyberspace” helps us make sense of the fact that we can communicate in a 
meaningful way via the Internet. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 
212 (2007). Whilst the idea of cyberspace as place is compelling, no one, as Mark Lemley points out, is 
actually “in” cyberspace. Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 523 (2003). 
Cyberspace is an imagined domain, made possible by a physical infrastructure of servers and computer 
hardware, connected by the Internet Server Protocols. Contra Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1996) (“Cyberspace is a place. People live there. They experience all the 
sorts of things that they experience in real space, there.”). 
 32.  ADRIAN SHAHBAZ & ALLIE FUNK, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2019: THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
6 (2019). 
 33.  Diego A. Martin et al., Recent Trends in Online Foreign Influence Efforts, 18(3) J. INFO. 
WARFARE 15 (2019). 
 34.  KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, CYBERWAR: HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS AND TROLLS HELPED 
ELECT A PRESIDENT: WHAT WE DON’T, CAN’T, AND DO KNOW 39 (2018); see also Rod Thornton & 
Marina Miron, Deterring Russian Cyber Warfare: The Practical, Legal and Ethical Constraints Faced 
by the United Kingdom, 4 J. CYBER POL’Y 257 (2019). 
 35.  CHEESEMAN & KLAAS, supra note 27, at 100–01. 
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interfere in the government of another.”36 Around the same time, in 1792, 
the British Government objected to an offer made by France to come “to the 
aid of all peoples who wished to recover their liberty.”37 The French 
Government then revoked the offer, resolving, “in the name of the French 
people, that it would not interfere in any manner in the government of other 
Powers.”38 The non-intervention rule crystalized in the period after the 1815 
Congress of Vienna, as European states reacted to nations involving 
themselves in domestic political disputes, notably in the putting down of 
popular uprisings in Naples and Spain (1820), in the Greek war of 
independence (1821-32), and in the creation of the independent state of 
Belgium (1830).39 By the middle of the nineteenth century, the principle was 
widely recognized.40 The 1836 edition of Wheaton’s, Elements of 
International Law notes, for example, that in relation to “elective 
governments, the choice of [those elected] ought to be freely made, in the 
manner prescribed by the constitution of the state, without the intervention 
of any foreign influence.”41 
By the twentieth century, the principle of non-intervention was firmly 
established.42 The best known, and most influential, statement on the subject 
can be found in the 1905 first edition of Oppenheim, which defines 
intervention as a “dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another 
State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of 
things.”43 The textbook also makes clear that “a State can adopt any 
 
 36.  EMER DE VATTEL, Of the Right to Security, and the Effects of the Sovereignty and Independence 
of Nations, in THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE 
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS § 54, at 154–55 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1870) (1758). 
De Vattel asserts that “affairs being solely a national concern, no foreign power has a right to interfere in 
them”. Id. at ch. III § 37. 
 37.  Lawrence Preuss, International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign States, 
28 AM. J. INT’L. L. 649, 654 (1934) (quoting Decree of Nov. 19, 1792, Archives parlamentaires, LIII 
(1ère sér.), p. 474). 
 38.  Id. (quoting Moniteur, April 16, 1793). 
 39.  P. H. Winfield, The History of Intervention in International Law, 3 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 130, 
138 (1922-1923). 
 40.  MOUNTAGUE BERNARD, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION: A LECTURE DELIVERED 
IN THE HALL OF ALL SOULS’ COLLEGE 10 (J. H. & J. Parker eds., 1860) (noting that there is “general 
agreement among writers on international law . . . that non-intervention is the general rule.”); see also 
KENT’S COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 40 (J.T. Abdy ed., 1878); THOMAS ALFRED WALKER, 
A MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1895). 
 41.  HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, WITH A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF 
THE SCIENCE 97 (1836). 
 42.  See, e.g., Winfield, supra note 39, at 140; see also ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 321 (1921). 
 43.  LASSA FRANCIS LAWERENCE OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 181 (1st ed. 
1905). 
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Constitution it likes, arrange its administration in a way it thinks fit, [and] 
make use of [its] legislature as it pleases.”44 
The non-intervention rule was not subsumed by the general prohibition 
on the use of force,45 which emerged in 1945 with the adoption of Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter.46 Article 2(7) of the Charter, which governs the 
relationship between the United Nations Organization and its Member 
States,47 expressed the importance of non-intervention.48 In 1949, the 
International Law Commission affirmed that every state “has the duty to 
refrain from intervention in the internal . . . affairs of any other State.”49 In 
1962, the General Assembly decided to examine the principles of 
international law, including the obligation “not to intervene in matters within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any State . . ..”50 Discussions in the Special 
Committee led to the adoption of the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility 
of Intervention,51 effectively precluding further deliberation on the subject.52 
Hence, the Declaration on Friendly Relations reflects the 1965 Declaration, 
affirming that “Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, 
economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by 
 
 44.  Id. at 171. 
 45.  Before the adoption of the UN Charter, there was a general prohibition on non-intervention, 
i.e., “interference in time of peace . . . through forceful measures.” Preuss, supra note 37, at 652. There 
was, somewhat paradoxically, no ban on a state resorting to war to achieve the same objective. R. J. 
VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 293 (1974). There were also notorious 
breaches of the non-intervention principle, notably the involvement of European powers in the Spanish 
Civil War. Norman J. Padelford, The International Non-Intervention Agreement and the Spanish Civil 
War, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 578 (1937). By the outbreak of World War II, the general view was that the 
classical doctrine of non-intervention had proved itself to be, in the words of Wilhelm Grewe, both 
“ineffective and unsatisfactory.” WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 595 
(Michael Byers trans., Walter de Gruyter 2000) (1984). 
 46.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. See also Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 
35 (Apr. 9). 
 47.  See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7 (“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . .”). 
 48.  See Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Principle of Non-Intervention, 
in CYBER WAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 249, 267 (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015) 
(discussing the importance of non-intervention). 
 49.  G.A. Res. 375 (IV), Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, art. 3 (Dec. 6, 1949). 
 50.  G.A. Res. 1815 (XVII), art 3(c) (Dec. 18, 1962). 
 51.  G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention]. 
 52.  See generally Piet-Hein Houben, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-Operation among States, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 703, 718 (1967) (discussing the attitudes 
of various states toward the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention); see also Robert 
Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A 
Survey, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 713, 729 (1971). 
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another State.”53 Subsequent General Assembly resolutions affirmed this 
position.54 
When the non-intervention principle came before the International 
Court of Justice in the 1986 Nicaragua case, the Court confirmed that the 
right of every state to conduct its affairs without outside interference was 
“part and parcel of customary international law.”55 In coming to this 
conclusion, the ICJ relied on both inductive and deductive reasoning, 
observing that “the opinio juris of States . . . [was] backed by established and 
substantial practice. It has moreover been presented as a corollary of the 
principle of the sovereign equality of States.”56 The Court then asked itself, 
what is the exact content of the principle? The ICJ did not look to the actual 
practice of states, but instead drew on the rule’s formulation in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations to conclude the following: 
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in 
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to 
decide freely. . . Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion 
in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.57 
The International Court of Justice outlines four elements to the non-
intervention rule. First, as an inter-state doctrine, the principle regulates 
deliberate interferences by one state in the affairs of another. Second, the 
interference must concern a matter which each sovereign state should be 
permitted to decide freely.58 Third, intervention is only wrongful when it uses 
methods of coercion.59 Finally, a coercive interference in the affairs of 
 
 53.  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations, at art. 1 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. According 
to the International Court of Justice, the Declaration on Friendly Relations “reflects customary 
international law.” Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J 403, ¶ 80 (July 22). 
 54.  G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Dec. 12, 1974); see 
also G.A. Res. 31/91, at 42 (Dec. 14, 1976); see also G.A. Res. 36/103, Declaration on the Inadmissibility 
of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (Dec. 9, 1981). 
 55.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 202. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. ¶ 205. 
 58.  See id. ¶ 263 (“The Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of 
intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has opted for some particular 
ideology or political system.”). 
 59.  Id. ¶ 205. Although the International Court of Justice noted that it was only dealing with those 
aspects of non-intervention relevant to the dispute before it (i.e. support for subversive or terrorist armed 
activities in another state), there is no doubt that coercion is an element in the non-intervention rule. The 
1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 51, at art. 2 establishes, inter alia, 
that “[n]o State may use [any] measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination 
of the exercise of its sovereign rights . . . .” (emphasis added). The 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, supra note 53, at pmbl. reaffirms “the duty of States to refrain in their international relations 
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another state violates international law, unless the action can be justified as 
a lawful countermeasure.60 
A. The Non-Intervention Doctrine in the Cyber Domain 
Notwithstanding the conceptual challenges posed by the Internet to 
notions of sovereignty and jurisdiction,61 there is growing agreement that the 
principle of non-intervention applies to the cyber domain.62 The United 
Nations Group of Governmental Experts has, for example, affirmed that 
international law applies to the use of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) by states63 and confirmed that, in their use of ICTs, 
“[S]tates must observe . . . [the principle of] non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other States.”64 In 2016, the General Assembly welcomed these 
conclusions,65 and two years later, established an Open-ended Working 
Group and Group of Governmental Experts to discuss the issues further.66 
Part of customary international law, the scope and content of the cyber 
non-intervention rule must be initially determined by an examination of state 
practice and opinio juris.67 In terms of state practice, the U.S. Council of 
 
from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence 
or territorial integrity of any State . . . .” (emphasis added). 
 60.  See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 249 (confirming that the law on countermeasures applied to 
the non-intervention principle). Article 22 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state 
responsibility establishes that the “wrongfulness of an act . . . is precluded if and to the extent that the act 
constitutes a [lawful] countermeasure.” G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, Responsibility of States for 
internationally wrongful acts, art. 22 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Responsibility of States]. 
 61.  There was some initial (mostly theoretical) debate about whether domestic laws and 
international law applied to the new domain of “cyberspace”, notably in the form of the 1996 Declaration 
of the Independence of Cyberspace. See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence 
(discussing the lack of governance in the cyber sphere). States have, perhaps unsurprisingly, concluded 
that the Internet is not a law-free zone. Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L. J. 
317, 327 (2015). 
 62.  Russell Buchan, Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?, 17 J. 
CONFLICT & SEC. L. 211, 221 (2012). 
 63.  Rep. of the Group of Gov. Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. and Telecomm. in the Context 
of Int’l Sec., ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013). 
 64.  Rep. of the Group of Gov. Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. and Telecomm. in the Context 
of Int’l Sec., ¶ 28, UN Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015). 
 65.  G.A. Res. 71/28, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security (Dec. 9, 2016), adopted by 181 votes to 0, with 1 abstention. 
 66.  Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., https://www.un.org/disarmament/ict-security 
(last visited June 19, 2020). 
 67.  Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists as one of the sources of 
international law, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” To show the 
existence and content of custom, there must be evidence of a general practice, and evidence of a belief 
the practice is required by international law (the opinio juris element). This two-element approach has 
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Foreign Relations’ Cyber Operations Tracker reports that twenty-eight 
countries are suspected of sponsoring cyber and influence operations, and 
that states have begun using sanctions to punish their alleged attacker.68 
There is, however, limited public state practice here. No country has 
accepted responsibility for carrying out a cyber or influence operation, and 
victim states often do not acknowledge that they have been attacked or 
invoke the right to engage in countermeasures.69 On the question of opinio 
juris: Australia,70 the Netherlands,71 United Kingdom,72 and United States73 
have all argued that cyber operations targeting elections are, or should be, 
violations of the non-intervention rule. Other democratic countries have not 
taken a public position, despite widespread concern about the dangers to 
democracy. France, for example, has confirmed the application of the non-
intervention principle to the cyber domain but said little else beyond noting 
that interferences in the political system may constitute a prohibited 
intervention.74 President Emmanuel Macron did, however, launch the Paris 
 
been confirmed by the International Court of Justice in North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. 
v. Neth.), Judgment 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20). See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of 
Its Seventieth Session, UN Doc. A/73/10, at 119 (2018) (assessing the identification of customary 
international law). 
 68.  Digital & Cyberspace Pol’y Program, Cyber Operations Tracker, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL., 
www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations (last visited June 19, 2020). 
 69.  Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyber 
Operations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 586 (2018). 
 70.  2019 International Law Supplement, AUSTL.’S INT’L CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY, 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/ 
aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement.html (last visited June 19, 2020) (“[T]he use by a 
hostile State of cyber operations to manipulate the electoral system to alter the results of an election in 
another State . . . would constitute a violation of the principle of non- intervention.”). 
 71.  Letter from Stef Blok, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Neth., to the President of the House of 
Representatives on the Int’l Legal Order in Cyberspace: Appendix: International Law in Cyberspace (July 
5, 2019) (on file with the government of the Netherlands) [hereinafter Letter on Int’l Legal Order in 
Cyberspace] (“Attempts to influence election outcomes via social media are [covered by] the non-
intervention principle.”). 
 72.  Jeremy Wright, Attorney General QC MP, Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century 
(May 23, 2018) (“[The] use by a hostile state of cyber operations to manipulate the electoral system to 
alter the results of an election in another state . . . must surely be a breach of the prohibition on 
intervention in the domestic affairs of states.”). 
 73.  In 2016, the U.S. State Department Legal Adviser, Brian Egan argued that “a cyber operation 
by a State that interferes with another country’s ability to hold an election or that manipulates another 
country’s election results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention.” Brian J. Egan, 
International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 169, 175 (2017). In 2020, the 
United States reaffirmed this position, with the Department of Defense General Council saying that “a 
cyber operation by a State that interferes with another country’s ability to hold an election” or that tampers 
with “another country’s election results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-intervention.” Paul 
C. Ney, Jr., DOD General Counsel, Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020). 
 74.  Przemyslaw Roguski, France’s Declaration on International Law in Cyberspace: The Law of 
Peacetime Cyber Operations, Part I, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 24, 2019), 
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Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace in 2018, which included a 
recognition of the need for states to “cooperate in order to prevent 
interference in electoral processes.”75 
Due to the limited evidence of state practice and opinio juris, we are 
left with the ICJ’s Nicaragua formulation: “Intervention is wrongful when it 
uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free 
ones.”76 There is no doubt that the outcome of an election is something that 
a democratic state should be permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, 
to decide freely—subject to applicable human rights laws on political 
participation.77 The only question is whether and when cyber and influence 
operations targeting elections can be categorized as coercive. The answer 
depends on the interpretation of “coercion”,78 left undefined by the 
International Court in its 1986 Nicaragua judgment. 
The rules for the interpretation of unwritten customary international law 
norms are the same as those governing the written provisions of treaties.79 
The basic approach to the interpretation of treaties is explained in Article 




 75.  Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, France, Cybersecurity: Paris Call of 12 November 
2018 for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, FRANCE DIPLOMACY, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ 
en/french-foreign-policy/digital-diplomacy/france-and-cyber-security/article/cybersecurity-paris-call-
of-12-november-2018-for-trust-and-security-in (last visited June 19, 2020) (Fr.). 
 76.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 205. 
 77.  G.A. Res. 217(III)A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ¶ 21 U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”); see also International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 25(b), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Every citizen 
shall have the right and the opportunity . . . To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression 
of the will of the electors . . . .”). 
 78.  Matthias Herdegen, Interpretation in International Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF 
PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 61, (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2012) (“It is evident that customary principles and rules also 
call for clarification of their scope and legal implications.”). 
 79.  See generally, Philip Allott, Interpretation: An Exact Art, in INTERPRETATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 373, 384–85 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015) (demonstrating how customary 
international law is normally interpreted); Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary 
Law, in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW: LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 13, 
17 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007) (exploring the interpretive questions 
facing customary international law); Panos Merkouris, Interpreting the Customary Rules on 
Interpretation 19 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 126, 137 (2017) (discussing the place of interpretation in the life-
cycle of customary international law). 
 80.  Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia 
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2016 I.C.J 100, ¶ 
33 (Mar. 17) (applying Article 31(1)’s general rule of interpretation to a dispute over treaty interpretation). 
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interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”81 Albert Bleckmann has persuasively argued that the same 
methodology can be applied to customary norms.82 The International Court 
of Justice has followed his general approach.83 
To establish the meaning of coercion, under the non-intervention 
principle, we must first look to the ordinary meaning of the term. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines coercion as the action of “coercing,” with 
coercing understood as “the application of force to control the action of a 
voluntary agent.”84 Second, we must examine the way the term is used in 
other areas of international law to ensure consistency. In the law of treaties, 
a treaty is void if consent has been procured by the coercion of the state, by 
the threat or use of force,85 or by the coercion of its representative through 
acts or threats directed against them.86 In the law on state responsibility, a 
state that coerces another state to act is responsible for that act.87 The 
International Law Commission describes the coercing state as the “prime 
mover in respect of the [wrongful] conduct,” and the coerced state as “merely 
 
 81.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 82.  Albert Bleckmann, Zur Feststellung and Auslegung von Völkergewohnheitsrecht, 37 ZAÖERV 
504, 526–28 (1977) (Ger.). 
 83.  See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 20 (Dec. 22); 
Arrest Warrrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 53 (Feb. 14); 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment 2012 I.C.J. 99, ¶ 57 
(Feb. 3). See generally, Peter Staubach, The Interpretation of Unwritten International Law by Domestic 
Judges, in THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS 113, 125–26 (Helmut 
Philipp Aust & Georg Nolte eds., 2016) (examining domestic courts’ approaches to customary 
international law); PETER G. STAUBACH, THE RULE OF UNWRITTEN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CUSTOMARY 
LAW, GENERAL PRINCIPLES, AND WORLD ORDER 153–54 (1st. ed. 2020) (explaining the continued 
relevance of customary international law from philosophical and theoretical standpoints). 
 84.  Coercion, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.oed.com (search “coercion” in 
search bar). 
 85.  Vienna Convention, supra note 81, art. 52. Provides that “a treaty is void if its conclusion has 
been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations.” Article 52 has a limited conception of coercion, resulting from “the 
threat or use of force,” although there is some debate as to whether this extends to violations of the non-
intervention principle. Olivier Corten, Article 52, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON 
THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 1201, 1210 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011). 
 86.  Vienna Convention supra note 81, art. 51. Provides that “the expression of a State’s consent to 
be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats 
directed against him shall be without any legal effect.” Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, supra note 8, at 246 
(explaining that coercion covers “any form of constraint of or threat against a representative.”). 
 87.  Responsibility of States, supra note 60, art. 18 (stating that “a State which coerces another State 
to commit an act is internationally responsible for that act if: (a) the act would, but for the coercion, be 
an internationally wrongful act of the coerced State; and (b) the coercing State does so with knowledge 
of the circumstances of the act.”). 
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its instrument.”88 Finally, we must account for the object and purpose of the 
principle of non-intervention, which differentiates between unwelcome 
interferences by foreign powers and prohibited intermeddling in internal 
affairs.89 The ban is on coercive interferences and not interferences per se.90 
In other words, the element of coercion establishes a high threshold, 
requiring evidence of control of the target state by the outside power. 
Applying the basic rules for the interpretation of the word coercion 
provides limited guidance for the application of non-intervention to the cyber 
domain. The government of the Netherlands explains the point this way: 
The precise definition of coercion, and thus of unauthorised intervention, 
has not yet fully crystallised in international law. In essence it means 
compelling a state to take a course of action (whether an act or an 
omission) that it would not otherwise voluntarily pursue. The goal of the 
intervention must be to effect change in the behaviour of the target state.91 
The Dutch government’s position makes the point that coercion 
involves getting the target state to do something that it would not otherwise 
do voluntarily. But there is no discussion as to how the outside power can 
get the target to act differently. In other words, there is no detailed 
explanation of what constitutes coercion. 
IV. THE MEANING OF COERCION 
To get a deeper and more complete understanding of “coercion,” this 
article turns to philosophical and jurisprudential debates on the notion of 
coercion in inter-personal relations.92 There are two reasons for this. First, 
the same term is used in both the inter-personal context and in international 
 
 88.  Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 65 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States]. 
 89.  See MOUNTAGUE BERNARD, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION 7–8 (J. H. & J. Parker 
eds., 1860) (illustrating the principle of non-intervention). Whilst it may be legitimate for one state to try 
to influence the decision-making of another, the foreign power cannot attempt to supplant the right of a 
state to come its own conclusions on questions of internal and external affairs, because this would 
undermine the sovereignty of the target state. 
 90.  See Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 345, 348 (2009) (explaining the concept of interference under the non-intervention principle). 
 91.  Letter on Int’l Legal Order in Cyberspace, supra note 71. Australia has adopted a similar 
position, “[a] prohibited intervention is one that interferes by coercive means (in the sense that they 
effectively deprive another state of the ability to control, decide upon or govern matters of an inherently 
sovereign nature).” 2019 International Law Supplement, supra note 70. 
 92.  The focus here is the relationship between voluntary agents—we are not concerned with the 
exercise of coercive power by the state over its citizens. In this context, the sociologist, Max Weber draws 
a distinction between physical coercion in the application of the law, involving arrest and detention, etc., 
and psychological coercion, whereby subjects feel compelled to comply with the law, without formal 
enforcement. See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 34 (G. Roth & C. Wittich trans., Univ. of Cal. 
Press 1978) (1921). 
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relations. We see this clearly in Section 2 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, which establishes that a treaty is void, if it has been procured 
by the “coercion of a representative of a state” (Article 51) or by the 
“coercion of a state” (Article 52). Second, epistemic humility suggests that 
something might be gained from international lawyers engaging with the 
cognate disciplines of philosophy and the philosophy of law, where our 
colleagues have been thinking about the meaning of coercion for more than 
half a century. 
A. Coercive Threats 
Coercion is often understood in terms of a coercive threat, typically in 
the form of “your money, or your life.” In his 1969 essay on the subject, the 
philosopher, Robert Nozick explains that coercion involves a threat by one 
voluntary agent (“P”) to another (“Q”) where if Q does not do a certain action 
(“X”), then deleterious consequences will follow for Q.93 Coercion involves, 
then, a self-interested act by P,94 which is intended to bring about a change 
in the behaviour of Q, by threatening deleterious consequences for Q.95 
Unlike the certain action (X), it is thus within P’s control to ensure the 
threatened consequences come about. Q is aware of the threat. The threat 
spurs the change in Q’s behaviour. Thus, coercion involves a conscious but 
unwilling act on the part of the Victim. In the case of the threat by the 
Robber, the Victim acts consciously when they hand over the cash, in that 
they know what they are doing, but do so unwillingly.96 
B. Coercive Force 
Nozick’s essay triggered a flurry of articles throughout the 1970s and 
1980s in the disciplines of philosophy and jurisprudence on the meaning of 
coercion.97 While his account focused on coercive threats, where the victim 
acts for themselves but is not given a meaningful choice, other writers 
concluded that the term could also be applied to circumstances of physical 
 
 93.  See Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
ERNEST NAGEL 440, 441–45 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969). 
 94.  Threats are distinguished from warnings on the ground that warnings may not be self-interested; 
or might be advisory; or it might not be within P’s power to ensure the deleterious consequences. Id. at 
444–45. 
 95.  Threats are distinguished from offers on the basis that, although negative consequences might 
arise in the imagined, unrealized future, if Q does not take up the offer, the consequences are not 
deleterious compared to the normal or expected course of events (those that would have happened had 
the offer not been made). See id. at 447. 
 96.  See H. J. McCloskey, Coercion: Its Nature and Significance, 18 S. J. PHIL. 335, 336 (1980) 
(“When one is coerced, one still acts.”). 
 97.  Hiba Hafiz, Beyond Liberty: Toward a History and Theory of Economic Coercion, 83 TENN. 
L. REV. 1071, 1085–86 (2016). 
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coercion. The philosopher, Michael Bayles, for example, maintains that there 
is no difference between a situation where someone says “sign this contract, 
or I will kill you,” and where they grab your hand and force your signature.98 
This is echoed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
establishes that the representative of the state can be coerced “through acts 
or threats directed against him.”99 Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach 
explain the difference in the Roman law terms of vis absoluta (physical 
coercion), where the representative’s hand is held and guided when signing 
the agreement, and vis compulsive (moral coercion), where the representative 
is blackmailed into signing the treaty.100 Giovanni Distefano notes that when 
physical force is used to get someone to sign a treaty, “what is at stake is 
almost emptying the body of the coerced person of all its free will, and 
substituting this for another’s will.”101 
However, physical force is not coercive simply because P does 
something to Q.102 If P pushes Q into the swimming pool, we say that Q has 
been forced into the water, not that they have been coerced into the pool.103 
Physical force is only coercive where P uses force to get Q to do 
something.104 Thus, when P pushes Q into the pool, P forces Q into the water, 
but when P grabs Q’s hand and forces them to sign a treaty, then P coerces 
Q. In other words, we speak about coercion when P exercises power over Q, 
by getting Q to do something they would not otherwise do.105 
C. Coercive Manipulation 
Coercion is wrong because the Victim is made to do something, without 
a choice in the matter. A coercive threat, for example, “is designed so that 
 
 98.  See Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in COERCION: NOMOS XIV 16, 18 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972); see also Martin Gunderson, Threats and Coercion, 9 CAN. J. 
PHIL. 247, 248 (1979). 
 99.  Vienna Convention, supra note 81, art. 51. 
 100.  VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 862 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten 
Schmalenbach eds., 2012); see also H.G. de Jong, Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties: A 
Consideration of Articles 51 and 52 of the Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 NETH. Y.B. INT’L. 
L. 209, 224 (1984). 
 101.  Giovanni Distefano, Article 51, in THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A 
COMMENTARY 1179, 1192 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011). 
 102.  See Craig L. Carr, Coercion and Freedom, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 59, 59 (1988). 
 103.  See Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”—Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L. 
J. 541, 565 (1985). 
 104.  See Gunderson, surpa note 98, at 250 (defining physical coercion in terms of P forcing Q to 
“do X,” so that X “is not an action of Q”). 
 105.  See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 203 (1957). 
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only one option will be regarded as acceptable.”106 In the case of coercive 
force, P bypasses Q’s decision-making process altogether, using Q as a 
“mere mechanical instrument.”107 In both cases, P wants Q to do something, 
and P wants to be certain this will happen. This leaves Q without a 
meaningful choice in the matter. This can also be done by way of coercive 
manipulation.108 In this case, P targets Q’s decision-making process,109 either 
by changing the information available to Q, or by changing the way that Q 
responds to existing facts.110 
There are lots of ways that we can get someone to “decide” to do 
something they would not otherwise do, and this is not always wrongful. 
Take the example of a charity worker who elicits a donation by telling a 
deliberately emotional true story about the child who will be helped by the 
gift. The relevant issue is, thus, whether we leave the other person with a 
choice. 
To make sense of the notion of coercive manipulation, we must see 
coercion as part of a spectrum of force. The legal philosopher, Joel Feinberg, 
explains that there are many ways of getting a person to act but only some 
can be described as forcing them to act. He explains that the various 
techniques can be placed on a spectrum of force, running from physical 
compulsion on one end, to manipulation, persuasion, enticement, and simple 
requests for action at the other.111 Thus, if P wants Q to stay in a room, P can: 
hold the door shut (compulsion), tell Q that, if they leave the room, P will 
kill them (coercion), tell Q there is a terrorist outside, with a suicide vest, 
when this is not true (manipulation), tell Q that P will be upset if Q leaves 
(again, manipulation), tell Q that they will get $1,000, if they stay in the room 
(enticement), or simply ask Q to stay in the room (request for action). In all 
cases, P’s objective is the same: get Q to stay in the room. The division is 
between P’s actions that leave Q with a meaningful choice, and those that do 
not. 
There is no problem with P getting Q to do something they would not 
otherwise do by giving them new facts. Thus, if Q refuses to give up smoking 
tobacco, P can show them graphic photographs of the damage that smoking 
 
 106.  Grant Lamond, Coercion and the Nature of Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 35, 40 (2001); see also 
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 172 (1988). 
 107.  E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.16 (1982). 
 108.  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373 (1986); see also T. M. Wilkinson, Nudging 
and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUD. 341, 351 (2013). 
 109.  See Michael Kligman & Charles M. Culver, An Analysis of Interpersonal Manipulation, 17 J. 
MED. & PHIL. 173, 187 (1992). 
 110.  See Gideon Yaffe, Indoctrination, Coercion, and Freedom of Will, 67 PHIL. &  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 335, 342 (2003). 
 111.  JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 189 (1986). 
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does to a person’s lungs. But this is not wrongful, because it does not 
undermine Q’s agency. The constitutional lawyer, Cass Sunstein, notes that 
an “action does not count as manipulative merely because it is an effort to 
alter people’s behavior.”112 He explains that if P is “just providing the facts,” 
in a sufficiently fair and neutral way, “it is hard to complain of 
manipulation.”113 
P can also try and change Q’s behaviour by warning of deleterious 
consequences, if Q does not do what P wants. Here, P introduces a new piece 
of information into Q’s decision-making process. For example, P might 
threaten to give Q the silent treatment if Q refuses to give up smoking.114 But 
there is nothing intrinsically wrongful about this. P is a voluntary agent, with 
the right to have their own views and opinions about Q’s behaviours, and P 
is entitled to impose costs on the voluntary actions of Q. To conclude 
otherwise would be to require P to accept all the consequences of Q’s actions. 
P’s warnings are only wrongful in terms of the difference between 
getting someone to act and forcing them to act, where they create a forced 
choice, leaving Q without a meaningful decision. The philosopher, Joel 
Rudinow explains the difference in terms of resistible and irresistible 
incentives, with an irresistible incentive defined as one “that no one could 
reasonably be expected to resist.”115 
However, this differs from P lying about the facts in order to get Q to 
do something that they would not otherwise do.116 A lie is a statement made 
by someone who does not believe in the truth of the statement, made with 
the intention that someone else shall be led to believe it.117 By lying, P 
deceives Q by changing Q’s perception of the true facts of the world and, 
therefore, changes the basis on which Q makes a decision. Hugo Grotius 
explains that lying is wrongful because it undermines the right of the target 
to “liberty of judgment,” that is Q’s right to come to their own conclusion 
based on a proper understanding of the facts.118 All lies are deceptive, in the 
sense of deceiving the target about the reality of the situation. Recall our 
 
 112.  Cass R. Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 213, 215 (2016). 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  The silent treatment is a recognized tactic of manipulation, often explained as emotional 
blackmail. See generally David M. Buss et al., Tactics of Manipulation, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1219, 1221 (1987). 
 115.  Joel Rudinow, Manipulation, 88 ETHICS 338, 341(1978). 
 116.  See Patrick Todd, Manipulation, in THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 3139, 
3139 (Hugh LaFollete ed., 2013). 
 117.  ARNOLD ISENBERG, Deontology and the Ethics of Lying, in AESTHETICS AND THEORY OF 
CRITICISM: SELECTED ESSAYS OF ARNOLD ISENBERG 245, 249 (William Callaghan et al. eds., 1973). 
 118.  HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, INCLUDING THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF 
NATIONS bk. III, ch. I § XI (Walter Dunne 1901) (1625). 
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example of P getting Q to stay in the room by saying, “do not go outside, 
there is a terrorist, with a suicide vest.” If Q believes the lie, Q will be certain 
to stay in the room: Q will have been made to do something they would not 
otherwise have done, and they will have been given no choice in the matter. 
In these circumstances, lying is the functional equivalent of coercion,119 
because “[b]oth are ways of exerting control over the victim.”120 
Another way that P can gain power over Q is by undermining Q’s faith 
in their ability to make their own decisions. This can be done by constantly 
lying to Q, through blatant denials of things which are true, or by telling Q 
they are imagining things. This is often described in the literature as 
gaslighting,121 which is the functional equivalent of coercion. With 
gaslighting, P exercises control over Q by undermining Q’s confidence in 
their capacity to decide things for themselves, so that Q comes to rely on P 
and, therefore, does what P wants.122 
P can also look to gain control over Q through the systematic infliction 
of physical violence and psychological trauma, with the objective of 
destroying Q’s “sense of self” in relation to others.123 The result is often that 
P can get Q to do what P wants, without the constant need for the threat or 
use of physical violence so that, for example, Q appears to outsiders to be 
acting on their own accord.124 This can be seen in the practice of 
brainwashing, also known as coercive persuasion.125 Brainwashing describes 
a deliberate attempt to change what a person thinks by imposing an exacting 
 
 119.  Allen W. Wood, Coercion, Manipulation, Exploitation, in MANIPULATION: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 17, 35 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2014) (“Deception by flat-out lying . . . feeds 
the person false information, on the basis of which he makes choices the person presumably might not 
have made if he had known the truth.” (emphasis in original)). 
 120.  David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 
354 (1991); see also SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 22 (1999) 
(“Deception, then, can be coercive. When it succeeds, it can give power to the deceiver . . . .”). 
 121.  The expression “gaslighting” was taken from Patrick Hamilton’s 1938 play, Gas Light, later 
made into a film starring Ingrid Bergman, which tells the story of a man intent on convincing his wife 
she is insane, so that she will be hospitalized and he can gain access to her jewels. 
 122.  See Kate Abramson, Turning Up the Lights on Gaslighting, 28 ETHICS 1, 2 (2014). 
 123.  JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 77 (1992). The phenomenon has been 
observed in prisoners of war, in political prisoners, hostages, and victims of human trafficking. In the 
case of domestic violence, the term “coercive control” is often applied. Evan Stark has successfully 
argued that the notion of coercive control can be extended to intimate partner relationships, because the 
objective is to achieve power over another person. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN 
ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 370 (2007). Coercive control has been criminalized in a few 
jurisdictions. Serious Crime Act 2015 § 76(1) (Eng.); Domestic Violence Act 2018 § 39(1) (Act No. 
6/2018) (Ir.); Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018, (ASP 5) § 1, ¶ 2. 
 124.  See Elizabeth Hopper & José Hidalgo, Invisible Chains: Psychological Coercion of Human 
Trafficking Victims, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 185, 209 (2006). 
 125.  EDGAR H. SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION: A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
“BRAINWASHING” OF AMERICAN CIVILIAN PRISONERS BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS 18 (1971). 
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regime requiring absolute obedience with severe physical and psychological 
punishments for non-compliance.126 The term was coined by Edward Hunter 
in 1950,127 and it was used to explain the fact that some American troops 
captured in the Korean War returned from prisoner-of-war camps as 
apparently committed communists, “ready to denounce their country of birth 
and sing the praises of the Maoist way of life.”128 In the 1958 draft of what 
became Article 51 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“coercion of a representative of a state”), the International Law 
Commission’s Special Rapporteur, Gerald Fitzmaurice, explained that the 
notion of coercion included “certain modern methods of compulsion 
summed up by the term ‘brainwashing.’”129 
V. THE COERCIVENESS OF CYBER AND INFLUENCE 
OPERATIONS 
The philosopher, Scott Anderson, explains that coercion is commonly 
understood as “a use of a certain kind of power for the purpose of gaining 
advantages over others . . . and imposing one’s will on the will of other 
agents.”130 We have seen, in the previous section, that one person can gain 
power and control over another through the deployment of coercive threats, 
the use of coercive force, and through coercive manipulation targeting the 
decision-making process. The notion of “coercion” can, then, be formulated 
in the following way: (1) P wants Q to do something and wants to be certain 
that this will happen–this second element distinguishes efforts to exercise 
power from mere influence; (2) P then takes some action to get Q to do that 
something, either by uttering a coercive threat, using coercive force, or 
engaging in coercive manipulation; and (3) because of P’s actions, Q does 
that something. 
We also must be clear about the difference between “coercion” and 
“coercive behaviour.” When the Robber says to the Victim, “your money, or 
 
 126.  Brainwashing, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/brainwashing 
(last visited June 19, 2020). For a (critical) introduction to the “dubious psychological syndrome” of 
brainwashing, see James T. Richardson, Brainwashing as Forensic Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF 
FORENSIC SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 77 (Stephen J. Morewitz & Mark L. Goldstein eds., 2014). 
Brainwashing is sometimes pleaded as a defense in domestic criminal cases, most notably, in the 
prosecution of the heiress Patty Hearst for joining her kidnappers in a bank robbery. See Joshua Dressler, 
Professor Delgado’s “Brainwashing” Defense: Courting a Determinist Legal System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 
335 (1979). 
 127.  Edward Hunter, Author and Expert On ‘Brainwashing,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1978, at 28. 
 128.  KATHLEEN TAYLOR, BRAINWASHING: THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT CONTROL 3 (2d. ed. 2017). 
 129.  G.G. Fitzmaurice (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 (1958). 
 130.  Scott Anderson, Coercion, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1 (Edward N. 
Zalta ed., 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/coercion. 
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your life,” and the Victim hands over the cash, we have all three elements of 
coercion. But, even if the efforts of the Robber are not successful, it is 
coercive behaviour131 where an action was “intended to force someone to do 
something.”132 In other words, only the first two elements of coercion 
constitute coercive behavior, i.e., where (1) P wants Q to do something and 
wants to be certain that this will happen; and (2) P then takes some action to 
get Q to do that something. But how can we know P’s intentions given the 
impossibility of knowing with certainty the motivations of others? The 
simple answer is that we cannot, but voluntary actions are presumably 
motivated. In the case of the utterance, “your money or your life,” the 
Robber’s presumed intention is to get the Victim to give them the cash. 
Otherwise, why would the Robber choose this formulation of words? 
The difference between coercion and coercive behaviour is important 
to the non-intervention principle because the International Court of Justice 
in the Nicaragua case was not concerned with the success of the United 
States’ conduct. The ICJ determined that “intervention is wrongful when it 
uses methods of coercion”,133 and that where a state “with a view to the 
coercion of another state, supports [an insurrectionist group], that amounts 
to an intervention.”134 A violation of the non-intervention rule does not, then, 
require evidence of a successful interference. Evidence that a foreign 
power135 intended to interfere decisively in the internal political affairs of the 
target state is sufficient. With respect to election interference, given the 
expenditure of time, money and the risk of condemnation if discovered, it is 
implausible to conclude that a foreign state would hack the ICTs used in an 
election, or engage in a sustained influence operation, for any reason other 
than to decisively influence the outcome of the vote. 
The following sections apply this understanding of the notion of 
coercion and the related concept of coercive behaviour, what the ICJ refers 
to as “methods of coercion,”136 to the problem of foreign state cyber and 
influence operations targeting elections, to explain the content of the non-
intervention principle in this context. 
 
 131.  Grant Lamond, Coercion, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 840, 841 (Hugh 
Lafollette ed., 2013). 
 132.  Grant Lamond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 52 (2000). 
 133.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 205 (emphasis added). 
 134.  Id. ¶¶ 241, 292. 
 135.  On the problems created by the architecture of the Internet for the factual attribution of state 
responsibility, see generally Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of 
Attribution, 17 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 229 (2012); see also Luke Chircop, A Due Diligence Standard of 
Attribution in Cyberspace, 67 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 643 (2018) (arguing due diligence should be a 
secondary rule of international law in the realm of cyber security). 
 136.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 205. 
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A. Cyber Threats 
The standard notion of coercion, which is of a coercive threat (“your 
money, or your life”), can be applied to international relations where an 
outside power makes a demand that leaves the target without a meaningful 
choice. For example, if a foreign power threatened a military invasion if the 
population voted a certain way in an election,137 this constitutes a coercive 
threat, and consequently, violates the non-intervention rule. 
Coercion establishes the dividing line between the unwelcome 
deployment of diplomatic, political, and economic pressure138 and unlawful 
intervention. Thus, when President Barack Obama asked the British public 
to vote against Brexit in the 2016 referendum, warning that the United 
Kingdom would be at the “back of the queue” in any trade deal with the U.S. 
if the U.K. chose to leave the European Union,139 this was an interference in 
domestic political affairs. However, he did not violate the non-intervention 
principle: it was not a threat that the electorate could not reasonably ignore. 
Warning of deleterious consequences is not by itself unlawful, provided that 
the targeted government or population remains free to make its own decision, 
which includes awareness of the position of the foreign power.140 
Express threats to the electorate or the political class in the target state 
can obviously be made via social media.141 New information and 
communications technologies also allow for the delivery of implied threats. 
In 2007, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on Estonia caused the 
websites of the President, Prime Minister and Parliament, amongst others, to 
crash, resulting in massive disruption to the political system. The attack 
 
 137.  The New York Times reported that, in 1996, “China fired missiles toward Taiwan in the days 
before the island’s first democratic presidential election in an attempt to intimidate voters from casting 
ballots for the democratic reformer Lee Teng-hui.” Chris Horton, Specter of Meddling by Beijing Looms 
Over Taiwan’s Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/ 
world/asia/taiwan-elections-meddling.html; see also Danny Gittings, China Threatens to Attack Taiwan, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2000, 10:07 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/feb/22/china. 
 138.  See Quincy Wright, Subversive Intervention, 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 521, 532 (1960). Others take a 
different view, for example, Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood conclude that intervention covers any 
situation “where one state becomes involved in the internal political processes of another.” Jamnejad & 
Wood, supra note 90, at 368. 
 139.  Anushka Asthana & Rowena Mason, Barack Obama: Brexit would put UK ‘Back of the Queue’ 
for Trade Talks, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/ 
22/barack-obama-brexit-uk-back-of-queue-for-trade-talks. 
 140.  See US Warns Turkey over Russian S-400 Missile System Deal, BBC (Apr. 4, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47809827. 
 141.  U.S. President Trump using his twitter account to warn Iran of “consequences the likes of which 
few throughout history have ever suffered” if the leadership in Iran continued to threaten the United 
States. Austin Ramzy, Trump Threatens Iran on Twitter, Warning Rouhani of Dire ‘Consequences,’ N.Y. 
TIMES (July 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/22/world/middleeast/trump-threatens-iran-
twitter.html. 
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began after the Estonian government decided to relocate the statue of the 
Bronze Soldier, which represents the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazism–a 
move that incensed Russia.142 There is an agreement in the literature that, if 
Russia was responsible, the DDoS attack would amount to a prohibited 
intervention,143 a coercive cyber threat in the form “Do not relocate the 
Bronze Soldier, or else.”144 But it is important to recall that Estonia did move 
the statue in the face of strong Russian protests.145 In other words, this failed 
attempt to intervene in domestic political affairs was still categorized as 
coercive—and a violation of the non-intervention rule—because the 
intention was to get the Estonian government not to do something it would 
otherwise have done. 
B. Cyber Power 
The term coercion describes a situation in which State P gets State Q to 
do something that Q would not otherwise do. One way this can be done is by 
using force. In its 1986 Nicaragua judgment, the International Court of 
Justice confirmed that “the element of coercion . . . is particularly obvious in 
the case of an intervention which uses force.”146 However, intervention is not 
solely concerned with the use of force. Where this is the case, the 
International Court of Justice uses the language of “use of force” and 
“violations of sovereignty.”147 The principle of non-intervention also 
protects the target state from being made to do something by the outside 
power.148 In the Nicaragua case, the the U.S. was trying to “coerce the 
 
 142.  See Adrian Blomfield, War of Words over Bronze Soldier, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 5, 2007, 12:01 
AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1541641/War-of-words-over-bronze-soldier.html; 
see also Damien McGuinness, How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia, BBC (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415. 
 143.  See Buchan, supra note 62; see also William Mattessich, Digital Destruction: Applying the 
Principle of Non-Intervention to Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Manifesting No Physical Damage, 
54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 873, 881 (2016). 
 144.  Nicholas Tsagourias explains the point this way: “To the extent that they were intended to put 
such pressure on Estonia to change its decision . . . they would constitute prohibited intervention.” 
Nicholas Tsagourias, Electoral Cyber Interference, Self-Determination and the Principle of Non-
Intervention in Cyberspace, in GOVERNING CYBERSPACE: BEHAVIOR, POWER AND DIPLOMACY 45, 48 
(Dennis Broeders & Bibi van den Berg eds., 2020). 
 145.  See Steven Lee Myers, Russia Rebukes Estonia for Moving Soviet Statue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/world/europe/27cnd-estonia.html. 
 146.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 205. 
 147.  Id. ¶ 251 (“[D]irect attacks . . . not only amount to an unlawful use of force, but also constitute 
infringements of the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua.”). 
 148.  It is therefore wrong to see non-intervention as one part of a hierarchy, with the use of force 
“above the threshold” and non-intervention “below.” The notion of a threshold implies that the crucial 
distinction is the amount of pressure involved, but this is a mistaken view, as Ellery Stowell pointed out 
in 1921: “[To] make the actual employment of force the criterion of interference. . . . [i]s to confuse the 
means with the purpose.” STOWELL, supra note 42, at 319 n.48. The crucial difference is that, in the case 
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government of Nicaragua into the acceptance of United States policies and 
political demands.”149 
The political scientist, Joseph Nye, pointed out that cyber power creates 
new opportunities for states to get other countries to do something they 
would not otherwise do, through their information and communications 
technologies.150 This kind of cyber operation is coercive in the same way that 
grabbing the hand of a state’s representative and forcing them to sign a treaty 
is coercive. The outside power forces the target state to do something, 
leaving them with no choice. To illustrate: 
State P hacks the Electoral Commission’s computer in State Q, so that 
State P’s preferred candidate is (wrongly) declared President. 
Without outside interference, the population in State Q will decide on 
their President, and the votes will be counted fairly by the Electoral 
Commission, which will then declare the winner. State P wants the Electoral 
Commission to declare its preferred candidate the winner. State P then hacks 
the Electoral Commission’s computer and changes the electoral result. When 
the Commission (wrongly) declares P’s preferred candidate the winner, the 
government body will have done something that it would not have done 
without P’s involvement, without any choice in the matter. State P’s cyber 
operation therefore violates the non-intervention rule. Furthermore, the 
operation’s scale is irrelevant. Even the insertion of a few bits of data into a 
software program constitutes coercion, because it involves forcing the target 
to do something it would not otherwise do. 
Cyber operations targeting the underlying ICTs used in elections, 
whether successful, or not, constitute prohibited interventions in internal 
affairs, because the foreign power acts with the intention of forcing the 
underlying technical infrastructure of the target state to do something (by 
taking control of its ICTs), or to not do something (by disabling its 
computers, computer networks, and websites), treating the government 
institution responsible for the conduct of the election as a “mere mechanical 
instrument”151 of the outside power. 
 
of use of force, the target state is acted upon; in the case of intervention, the outside state achieves its 
objectives by working through the target state. This distinction was recognized in 1922 by Percy Winfield, 
who explained that the objective of intervention was not “the infliction of a blow upon the resources of a 
state, but the usurpation of some part of its powers of government.” Winfield, supra note 39, at 142. 
 149.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 239. 
 150.  See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Cyber Power, BELFER CTR. SCI. & INT’L AFF. 7 (2010), available at 
belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/cyber-power.pdf. 
 151.  On the notion that the coerced state is the “mere instrument” of the outside power. See Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 88; FARNSWORTH, supra note 107, at § 4.16. 
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C. Cyber Influence Operations 
Cyber influence operations represent a new form of inter-state 
propaganda.152 One feature of the Internet is that it allows foreign powers to 
directly influence political discussions in other states, by making news 
stories, opinion pieces, and other forms of communication publicly available 
on websites and social media. Influence operations are wrongful, under 
international law, when they fall under a proscribed category of 
communication, notably the prohibition on subversive propaganda,153 or the 
influence operation uses, in the words of the Nicaragua judgment, “methods 
of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.”154 There 
is no doubt that an election concerns a choice that should remain free. The 
only question is whether cyber influence operations can be categorized as 
coercive. 
1. Information Campaigns 
There is widespread agreement in the literature that providing the 
citizens of another country with factual information, including information 
critical of the government of that state,155 does not constitute a prohibited 
intervention.156 Genuine news broadcasts by state-owned and state-
controlled media do not necessarily fall within the definition of unlawful 
propaganda, “for news broadcasts are the transmission of facts.” The same 
holds for commentaries on the news, defined as “an intellectual appraisal or 
 
 152.  John Martin explains that propaganda involves “a systematic attempt through mass 
communications to influence the thinking and thereby the behavior of people.” L. JOHN MARTIN, 
INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA: ITS LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONTROL 12 (1958). He makes the point 
that inter-state propaganda “involves appealing to the masses, as opposed to governments.” Id. at 16. 
 153.  The prohibition on subversive propaganda is “a deep-rooted principle of customary 
international law.” Eric de Brabandere, Propaganda, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. 
para. 13 (2012). See, H. Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Propaganda by Governments, 13 TRANSACTIONS 
GROTIUS SOC’Y 143, 146 (1927); John B. Whitton, Propaganda and International Law, 72 COLLECTED 
COURSES HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L. 542, 582–83 (1948). The prohibition establishes a limited, albeit 
absolute, prohibition on inter-state propaganda that calls on the population to reject an established 
sovereign authority. See, for example, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 53, which 
provides that no State shall organize “subversive . . . activities directed towards the violent overthrow of 
the regime of another State.” 
 154.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 205. See, on this point, Richard A. Falk, The United States and the 
Doctrine of Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of Independent States, 5 HOW. L. J. 163, 186 (1959). 
 155.  See Philip Kunig, Intervention, Prohibition of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L 
L. para. 24 (2008). 
 156.  Eric de Brabandere explains that propaganda is a method of communication “aimed at 
influencing and manipulating the behaviour of people in a certain predefined way. The element of 
influenc[e] and manipula[tion] is at the centre of the concept [of propaganda] and distinguishes it from 
mere factual information.” Brabandere, supra note 153, at para. 1. 
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evaluation, . . . founded upon facts, . . . [and] the result of honest opinion.”157 
In the same way that attempting to influence another person by “just 
providing the facts” is not wrongful,158 efforts by one state to influence the 
population of another by providing factual information and commenting on 
news stories is not prohibited under international law.159 
The general rule that providing facts does not violate the non-
intervention rule applies to the practice of “doxfare.” Doxfare involves the 
hacking of private computer systems and putting any sensitive information 
obtained into the public domain, with the intention of influencing the internal 
affairs of another state.160 The best known example is the DNC-hack, which 
occurred during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.161 The practice was also 
seen in the 2017 French presidential election when emails from Emmanuel 
Macron’s campaign were leaked onto the web,162 and there have been major 
 
 157.  ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS JR., NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS 
IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 291 (1956). 
 158.  See Sunstein, supra note 112. 
 159.  When we speak about “factual information”, we are concerned with things that are actually the 
case, i.e. things that correspond to the “truth.” The meaning of “truth” has been debated in philosophy for 
hundreds of years, and there is much discussion today about the notion of “post-truth.” All of this is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 160.  Kilovaty, supra note 10, at 152–53. Kilovaty’s position is clearly normative, making the case 
that “international law should adapt to the digital era’s threats.” Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
 161.  On the international law applicable to the “DNC hack”, see Logan Hamilton, Beyond Ballot-
Stuffing: Current Gaps in International Law Regarding Foreign State Hacking to Influence a Foreign 
Election, 35 WIS. INT’L L. J. 179 (2017); see also Duncan B. Hollis, Russia and the DNC Hack: What 
Future for a Duty of Non-Intervention?, OPINIOJURIS (July 25, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/07/25/ 
russia-and-the-dnc-hack-a-violation-of-the-duty-of-non-intervention/. 
 162.  Andy Greenberg, The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election ‘Infrastructure’, 
WIRED (Sept. 5, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-director-confirms-russia-hacked-
french-election-infrastructure/. The outgoing President, François Hollande “openly warned Russia to let 
up its attacks on the Macron campaign . . . .” ERIK BRATTBERG & TIM MAURER, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 
FOR INT’L PEACE, RUSSIAN ELECTION INTERFERENCE: EUROPE’S COUNTER TO FAKE NEWS AND CYBER 
ATTACKS 11 (2018), available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_333_Brattberg_Maurer_  
Russia_Elections_Interference_Brief_FINAL.pdf. Whether Russia was responsible is unclear. See 
LAURA GALANTE & SHAUN EE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, DEFINING RUSSIAN ELECTION INTERFERENCE: AN 
ANALYSIS OF SELECT 2014 TO 2018 CYBER ENABLED INCIDENTS 12 (2018), available at 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Defining_Russian_Election_Interference_ 
web.pdf. 
WHEATLEY_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2021  11:12 AM 
2020] FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN ELECTIONS 189 
data hacks of politicians in Australia,163 Cambodia,164 and Germany.165 
Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, threatened Russia with 
“consequences” if it happened again.166 There is no question that doxfare 
raises issues around data protection and the privacy rights of individuals, but 
it is difficult to see how it can be categorized as a prohibited intervention 
because the objective is to place factual information in the public domain. 
Consequently, unless we can show the existence of some international law 
equivalent to the fruit of the poisonous tree rule in U.S. criminal law (which 
excludes the admission into court of evidence obtained through illegal 
means), doxfare is not a violation of the principle of non-intervention, 
because “just providing the facts” is not prohibited although the facts are 
unlawfully obtained. 
There is one exception to the general rule that “just providing the facts” 
is not unlawful: that is where the outside power inundates the information 
environment in the target state with a single political narrative, drowning out 
all other voices. Elections require citizens to choose between different 
political options. Where one actor (normally the domestic government) 
ensures that citizens hear only one side of the argument, people are left 
without a proper choice when voting, because there will seem to be only one 
viable option. This is wrongful, even if the communications are factually 
accurate, or reflect genuinely held positions. In his major study on The 
International Law of Propaganda, first published in 1968, Bhagevatula 
Satyanarayana Murty explains that government propaganda is coercive when 
it exerts strong psychological pressure on the population to adopt a position. 
Whereas attempts at persuasion leave the citizen with several options, 
“coercion may be said to have been exercised when a person is subjected to 
a high degree of constraint in the choice of alternatives in shaping his 
conduct.”167 
Before the Internet, it was almost impossible for an outside power to 
overwhelm the information environment of another country. This remains 
 
 163.  Michael Jensen, We’ve Been Hacked—So Will the Data be Weaponised to Influence Election 
2019? Here’s What to Look for, CONVERSATION (Feb. 21, 2019, 4:54 PM), https://theconversation.com/ 
weve-been-hacked-so-will-the-data-be-weaponised-to-influence-election-2019-heres-what-to-look-for-
112130. 
 164.  Yuichiro Kanematsu, Fears of Chinese Cybermeddling Grow After Cambodia Election, NIKKEI 
(Aug. 18, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Fears-of-Chinese-
cybermeddling-grow-after-Cambodia-election. 
 165.  Janosch Delcker, Germany Whacked by Big Data Hack, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2019, 5:09 PM), 
https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-data-hack-merkel-whacked/. 
 166.  Oliver Moody, Merkel Anger over Russian Hacking, TIMES (May 14, 2020, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/merkel-anger-over-russian-hacking-lkhwnn05w. 
 167.  B.S. MURTY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPAGANDA: THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT 
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 28 (1989). 
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largely the case today. But as more people get their news and commentaries 
from social media, the dangers of a foreign power inundating the information 
environment with a single political narrative increase. The Washington Post 
reports, for example, that, during Taiwan’s 2018 local elections, “citizens 
were bombarded with anti-[Government] content through Facebook, Twitter 
and online chat groups . . . .”168 The presumed objective of the People’s 
Republic of China, the assumed source of the information operation, was to 
undermine the governing Democratic Progressive Party, which supports 
Taiwanese independence from mainland China.169 Each individual 
communication might fall into the category of factual information or fair 
comment. But bombarding citizens with news stories and commentaries to 
develop a dominant political narrative violates the non-intervention rule, 
where the objective is to drown out all other voices, and therefore constrain 
the choices available to voters. 
2. Lies and Deception: Fake News 
Although influence operations can involve the dissemination of factual 
information, the primary concern is fake news.170 According to a common 
definition, “fake news items are lies– that is, deliberately false factual 
statements, distributed via news channels.”171 In other words, fake news 
mimics the traditional news media, but lacks its commitment to accuracy.172 
Although the main worry is the dissemination by domestic actors, states have 
also expressed concern about foreign powers spreading deliberately false 
news stories in order to disrupt the functioning of democracy.173 For 
example, the British Prime Minister, Theresa May complained in 2017 that 
 
 168.  Josh Rogin, China’s Interference in the 2018 Elections Succeeded—In Taiwan, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 18, 2018, 8:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/18/chinas-interference-
elections-succeeded-taiwan/. 
 169.  Horton, supra note 137. 
 170.  See SAMANTHA BRADSHAW & PHILIP N. HOWARD, OXFORD, CHALLENGING TRUTH AND 
TRUST: A GLOBAL INVENTORY OF ORGANIZED SOCIAL MEDIA MANIPULATION 6 (2018). Studies have 
shown that people often struggle to distinguish fact from fiction on the Internet and in social media. 
Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and Partisan 
Election Administration, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 66 (2017). 
 171.  Björnstjern Baade, Fake News and International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1357, 1358 (2019). 
 172.  David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a 
Multidisciplinary Effort, 359 SCI. MAG. 1094, 1094 (Mar. 9, 2018). 
 173.  The use of “bots”—short for “robots,” software applications that pretend to be human and 
reproduce content in social media on a massive scale—ensures that fake news spreads quickly. The head 
of the U.K.’s domestic counter-intelligence and security agency complained that, “[a]ge-old attempts at 
covert influence and propaganda have been supercharged in online disinformation, which can be churned 
out at massive scale and little cost.” Andrew Parker, MI5 Director General, U.K., Speech to BFV 
Symposium in Berlin (May 14, 2018), www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-andrew-parker-speech-
to-bfv-symposium. 
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Russia was “seeking to weaponize information[,] [d]eploying its state-run 
media organisations to plant fake stories and photo-shopped images in an 
attempt to sow discord in the West and undermine our institutions.”174 
Fake news does not, by definition, enjoy the protection accorded to 
factual information under the principle of non-intervention, but there is no 
specific prohibition on fake news.175 Fake news is therefore only wrongful 
when it can be categorized as coercive. Coercion, as we have seen, describes 
a situation in which State P forces the government or citizens in State Q to 
do something they would not otherwise do. One way this can be done is by 
disseminating fake news, that is by lying with the intention of deceiving the 
target into thinking and acting differently.176 Take the following hypothetical 
example:177 
During a presidential election campaign in State Q, the intelligence agency 
in State P creates and then releases on the Internet a fake video that appears 
to show, in convincing detail, the sitting President Jones engaged in sexual 
acts with a child. 
To get the population in State Q to vote for someone other than Jones, 
State P releases the deep fake178 that shows President Jones doing something 
he never did. We have seen that all lies are deceptive, in the sense of 
deceiving the target about the reality of the situation, but some lies are 
intentionally structured so that they lack any choice as to what to think, and 
therefore what to do. If the electorate votes for a different candidate because 
of the video, citizens will have been deceived into doing something they 
would not otherwise have done. Moreover, they will have been given no 
meaningful choice, because they were given a false perception of Jones. 
When evaluating the coerciveness of a fake news story attributable to a 
foreign power, we must ask two questions: (1) Was the message 
communicated with the intention of deceiving the target audience into 
 
 174.  Theresa May, Prime Minister, U.K., Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2017 (Nov. 13, 2017), 
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-to-the-lord-mayors-banquet-2017. 
 175.  The 1981 General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention includes an 
obligation for states “to combat . . . the dissemination of false or distorted news which can be interpreted 
as interference in the internal affairs of other States . . .” G.A. Res. 36/103, supra note 54, ¶ 2(III)(d). 
Because the Declaration was adopted by 120 votes to 22, following opposition by Western states, it is not 
generally regarded as reflecting customary international law. 
 176.  Björnstjern Baade explains that fake news, in the strict sense of a false news item, which is 
intentionally fabricated, is “coercive,” because “the projection of a different set of facts constrains one’s 
freedom to act by making certain options and conclusions no longer seem viable or making others seem 
mandatory.” Baade, supra note 171, at 1364. 
 177.  On the practice of releasing deep fake sex tapes, see generally Ben Collins, Russia-Linked 
Account Pushed Fake Hillary Clinton Sex Video, NBC NEWS, (Apr. 11, 2018, 4:49 PM), https:// 
www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/russia-linked-account-pushed-fake-hillary-clinton-sex-video-n864871. 
 178.  On “deep fakes” see generally, Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A 
Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753 (2019). 
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believing a falsehood?179 (2) Would a reasonable observer judge that the 
communication was intended to influence the target’s decision-making to 
such an extent that they would be left without a meaningful choice about 
what to think, and therefore what to do? If the answer to both is in the 
affirmative, the communication violates the principle of non-intervention. 
Consider two of the best known lies told during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election: that “Hillary Clinton [was] in very poor health due to a serious 
illness,” and that “Pope Francis [had] endorsed Donald Trump for 
president.”180 The first lie would be one intended to get voters to question 
Clinton’s fitness for office, but it is difficult to conclude that the second, 
concerning papal endorsement, was meant to play a decisive role in the 
electorate’s decision-making. In other words, the invented claim concerning 
Clinton’s health–if attributable to a foreign power–would violate the non-
intervention rule, whereas the false reporting of the Pope’s views would not. 
3. Disinformation Campaigns 
The basic political question in any democracy is: what should we do? 
This is answered by a general election or referendum, and by the governing 
political class—those involved in making political decisions—at other times, 
with a recognition of the importance of maintaining the support of the 
electorate for policy positions. Political will-formation depends on the 
availability of reliable information, and the capacity of the public and the 
political class to deliberate and decide on the best course of action. Fake 
news feeds false information, in order to get them to act differently. 
Disinformation campaigns also rely on fabricated information,181 but the 
objective is to undermine the capacity of the population or the political class 
to make decisions in their own interests. 
Disinformation is misleading information that is likely to create false 
beliefs, where it is “no accident that it is misleading.”182 Similar to lying, 
disinformation involves a deliberate attempt to mislead, but in the case of 
 
 179.  Hugo Grotius defines lying as: 
[T]he known and deliberate utterance of any thing contrary to our real conviction, intention, 
and understanding. . . . [T]he propagation of a truth, which any one believes to be false, in him 
amounts to a lie. There must be in the use of the words therefore an intention to deceive, in 
order to constitute a falsehood in the proper and common acceptation. 
HUGO GROTIUS, supra note 118, at bk. III, ch. I, § X (emphasis in original). 
 180.  Richard Gunther et al., Trump May Owe His 2016 Victory to ‘Fake News,’ New Study Suggests, 
CONVERSATION (Feb. 15, 2018, 6:34 AM), https://theconversation.com/trump-may-owe-his-2016-
victory-to-fake-news-new-study-suggests-91538. 
 181.  See generally, Henning Lahmann, Information Operations and the Question of Illegitimate 
Interference Under International Law, 53(2) ISR. L. REV. 189 (2020) (examining state-led information 
campaigns designed to undermine democratic decision-making processes in other states). 
 182.  Don Fallis, What Is Disinformation?, 63 LIBR. TRENDS 401, 406 (2015) (emphasis added). 
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disinformation the objectives and goals are “often political.”183 The most 
widely cited example of a disinformation campaign is the 2016 “Our Lisa” 
case in Germany, involving the dissemination of the untrue story about the 
abduction and rape of an underage Russian-German girl by Arab migrants.184 
The security expert, Constanze Stelzenmüller, explains that the widespread 
reporting of the story on social media by Russian actors was intended “to 
sow confusion, doubt, and distrust.”185 This was part of a wider influence 
campaign by Russia, intended to undermine the confidence of German 
citizens, including the three million ethnic Russian-German minority,186 in 
the leadership of the Chancellor, Angela Merkel, regarding her stance on 
Russia’s interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.187 
The objectives of a disinformation campaign are to create decision-
making paralysis and/or to shift the policy position of the target so it comes 
to align with the interests of the foreign power. Decision-making paralysis is 
achieved by creating confusion about the facts of the situation and 
undermining confidence in the capacity of the democratic system to deliver 
the best policy outcomes. The outside power can then feed information and 
disinformation into the political debate in order to get the target population 
or political class to move themselves to a policy position that aligns with the 
interests of the outside power.188 This is described in the literature in terms 
of reflexive control.189 
 
 183.  James H. Fetzer, Disinformation: The Use of False Information, 14 MINDS & MACH. 231, 232 
(2004). On “disinformation” see generally, W. Lance Bennett & Steven Livingston, The Disinformation 
Order: Disruptive Communication and the Decline of Democratic Institutions, 33 EUR. J. COMM. 122 
(2018) (discussing recent disinformation campaigns meant to disrupt the normal political order); L. John 
Martin, Disinformation: An Instrumentality in the Propaganda Arsenal, 2 POL. COMM. 47 (1982) 
(providing a Cold War perspective distinguishing disinformation from run-of-the-mill propaganda). 
 184.  Stefan Meister, The “Lisa Case”: Germany as a Target of Russian Disinformation, NATO 
REV. (July 25, 2016), https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/07/25/the-lisa-case-germany-as-a-
target-of-russian-disinformation/index.html. 
 185.  The Impact of Russian Interference on Germany’s 2017 Elections: Hearing Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 44 (2017) (statement of Constanze Stelzenmüller, Fellow, Royal 
Swedish Academy for War Sciences). 
 186.  The target of a disinformation campaign can be the entire population, or one section, exploiting 
divisions in society. The resulting lack of political cohesion can make it difficult for a democratic 
government to act. See MARTIN MOORE, DEMOCRACY HACKED: POLITICAL TURMOIL AND INFORMATION 
WARFARE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 80 (2018). 
 187.  See Kaan Sahin, Germany Confronts Russian Hybrid Warfare, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE, (July 26, 2017), https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/07/26/germany-confronts-russian-
hybrid-warfare-pub-72636. 
 188.  See Timothy L. Thomas, Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military, 17 J. SLAVIC MIL. 
STUD. 237, 241 (2004). 
 189.  See Han Bouwmeester, Lo and Behold: Let the Truth Be Told: Russian Deception Warfare in 
Crimea and Ukraine and the Return of “Maskirovka” and “Reflexive Control Theory, in NETHERLANDS 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF MILITARY STUDIES 2017 at 125, 140 (Paul Ducheine & Frans Osinga eds., 2017). 
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There is commonly a double deception at the heart of disinformation 
campaigns. First, there is deception of the target. Second, there is often an 
attribution deception, whereby the foreign power hides its identity through 
the use of sock puppets.190 A sock puppet is defined, in the context of the 
Internet,191 as a “pseudonym adopted by someone who has made a posting to 
some social media forum and then follows it up with a supportive posting 
using the pseudonym.”192 During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
Russian social media accounts often represented themselves as American 
citizens.193 In cases like this, the foreign power clearly hopes to achieve a 
level of influence by concealing the source of the communication, which it 
could not achieve through open and transparent messaging.194 
Disinformation campaigns that result in decision-making paralysis, or 
that cause a realignment of the policy position of the population or political 
class, so it comes to align with the interests of the foreign power, clearly 
violate the principle of non-intervention. Even when the efforts of the foreign 
power are not successful, disinformation campaigns can still be categorized 
as “methods of coercion,”195 and therefore violations of the non-intervention 
rule, in one of two circumstances. First, where we see a sustained campaign 
of disinformation by a foreign power which a reasonable observer would 
conclude was intended to create confusion about the facts of the situation 
and/or undermine the faith of the local population in the democratic system. 
 
On the application of the notion to Russian efforts in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, see Annie 
Kowalewski, Disinformation and Reflexive Control: The New Cold War, GEO. SEC. STUD. REV. (Feb. 1, 
2017), http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2017/02/01/disinformation-and-reflexive-control-
the-new-cold-war/. 
 190.  See Diego A. Martin et al., Recent Trends in Online Foreign Influence Efforts, 18 J. INFO. 
WARFARE no. 3, 15, at 16 (2019). 
 191.  The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY defines the term “sock puppet” as a person whose actions 
are controlled by another. Sock, n.1, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE (June 2020), 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/183797. 
 192.  A DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNET (Darrel Ince ed., 4th ed. 2019). 
 193.  See Jens David Ohlin, Election Interference: The Real Harm and The Only Solution 7 (Cornell 
Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, No. 18-50, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3276940; see generally, Christopher T Stein, Hacking the Electorate: A Non-Intervention Violation 
Maybe, but Not an “Act of War”, 37 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 29 (2020) (analyzing how to categorize 
the Russian disinformation operations during the 2016 U.S. election under international law). 
 194.  The social media platform, Facebook, has responded to the problem of, what it calls, 
“coordinated manipulation campaigns” by focusing on the issue of transparency, with its Head of 
Cybersecurity Policy explaining that: “The real issue is that the actors behind these campaigns are using 
deceptive behaviors to conceal the identity of the organization behind a campaign.” He describes 
“Foreign-led efforts to manipulate public debate in another country” as a “particularly egregious” 
example of a coordinated manipulation campaign. Nathaniel Gleicher, How We Respond to Inauthentic 
Behavior on Our Platforms: Policy Update, FACEBOOK (Oct. 21, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/ 
10/inauthentic-behavior-policy-update/. 
 195.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J, ¶ 205. 
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Second, where we see a sustained disinformation campaign that uses sock 
puppets, because, in these circumstances, it is clear the foreign power wants 
to manipulate the domestic debate, but also that it wants the population to 
believe that political discussions were not subject to outside interference. 
These disinformation campaigns are coercive, because the objective, in both 
cases, is to usurp the process of democratic self-determination, replacing the 
will of the local population with that of the outside power. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this article was to explain how we can apply the long-
established principle of non-intervention to the new problem of state cyber 
and influence operations targeting elections. There is general agreement that 
the formulation in the 1986 Nicaragua case provides the starting point for 
any discussion: a prohibited intervention must both concern a matter “which 
each State is permitted to decide freely,” and use “methods of coercion.”196 
There is also no doubt that the outcome of an election is a matter that 
democratic states should be permitted to decide freely, without outside 
intermeddling—this point has been clear from the emergence of the non-
intervention rule.197 The only question is whether and when cyber and 
influence operations targeting elections can be categorized as coercive—and 
that depends on how we understand the term. 
Words for international lawyers mean what international lawyers 
decide they mean.198 The agreed meaning of coercion will crystallise through 
the utterances of states, courts, tribunals, international law practitioners, and 
academics. It is, therefore, important for democratic countries to explain 
publicly which cyber and influence operations they consider to be violations 
of the non-intervention principle, or how and why certain forms of cyber and 
influence operation can be categorized as coercive. 
This article developed an argument for how we can, and should, 
understand the notion of coercion, by drawing on the arguments of our 
colleagues in the cognate disciplines of philosophy and the philosophy of 
law. The work showed that the function of the non-intervention rule is to 
protect the state from coming under the control of an outside power through 
its intermeddling in the information that voters and the political class rely on 
 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See WHEATON, supra note 41. 
 198.  The point is made clear in Whaling in the Antarctic, where the International Court of Justice 
drew a clear distinction between the way that scientists use the term “scientific research” and its 
international law meaning, with the ICJ deciding that “[t]heir conclusions as scientists . . . must be 
distinguished from the interpretation of the Convention, which is the task of this Court.” Whaling in the 
Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 82 (Mar. 31). 
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when making a decision; the capacity of the population and political class to 
engage in meaningful political deliberation; the right of the state to decide 
freely; or the sovereign right of the state to act for itself. The analysis led to 
the following conclusions. 
First, the provision of factual information and commentaries on the 
news by foreign states, including by state-owned and state-controlled news 
media, does not violate the principle of non-intervention, no matter how 
unfriendly or unwelcome.199 Consequently, the practice of doxfare is not a 
violation of the rule. Nor are comments made by the leaders of outside 
powers seeking to influence the outcome of a democratic election or 
referendum. Lying to the electorate, on the other hand, defined as providing 
deliberately false information, is prohibited where the intention is to get the 
population to vote differently. Fake news, in this narrow sense, involves the 
coercive manipulation of the decision-making process, because the objective 
is to deceive the target population into doing something it would not 
otherwise have done, absent the false information. 
Second, sustained disinformation campaigns are unlawful where the 
objective is to frustrate the target state’s capacity for meaningful democratic 
deliberation. This can be done in two ways: by paralyzing the decision-
making process, through the creation of confusion about the facts of the 
situation and undermining confidence in the ability of the system to deliver 
the correct policy outcomes; and by systematically feeding information and 
disinformation into political debates, in order to move the position of the 
population or political class so that it comes to align with the interests of the 
foreign power. Both involve methods of coercion because the objective is to 
usurp the target’s right to decide for themselves. Where there is evidence that 
a foreign power is using sock puppets, such as individuals pretending to be 
local citizens, and spreading disinformation, this clearly violates the non-
intervention rule. 
Third, where information and communications technologies are used to 
communicate to a government or population that they must decide a 
particular way, this constitutes a coercive threat and a violation of the non-
intervention rule. States are entitled to make representations and to warn of 
deleterious consequences if the government or population makes a certain 
decision. What outside powers are not permitted to do is frame the warning 
as a threat that could not reasonably be ignored because this creates a forced 
choice situation where the target is required to make the decision preordained 
by the foreign power. 
 
 199.  The one exception is an influence campaign designed to overwhelm the information 
environment with a single political narrative, as this prevents the electorate from making a meaningful 
choice between competing positions. 
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Finally, where a state cyber operation takes control of, or disables the 
functioning of, the ICTs that underpin the holding of elections, to ensure that 
the target acts as intended by the foreign power, this involves the coercive 
use of cyber power and constitutes a prohibited intervention. All uses of 
cyber power of this type are coercive, and therefore wrongful, because the 
outside power achieves its objective by working through bodies like the 
Electoral Commission, compelling them to do something they would not 
otherwise do–and thus making the target state’s institutions the instrument 
of a foreign power. 
 
